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The Big Guns: Pipedream Malware

April 14, 2022 · Updated November 17, 2026 · 3 min read

On April 13, 2022, the Department of Energy, CISA, the NSA and the FBI issued a joint cybersecurity advisory, AA22-103A, warning that advanced persistent threat (APT) actors had built custom tools to take full control of certain industrial control system (ICS) and SCADA devices. The industrial security firm Dragos named the toolkit Pipedream. Most small businesses do not run power plants, but the advisory’s advice applies to any company with machines, building systems or other equipment on its network.

What the advisory described

According to the advisory, the tools could scan for, compromise and control affected devices once the attackers had initial access to an operational technology (OT) network. The named targets were:

  • Schneider Electric programmable logic controllers (PLCs)
  • OMRON Sysmac NJ and NX PLCs
  • Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) servers

The attackers could also compromise Windows-based engineering workstations by installing and exploiting a known-vulnerable ASRock motherboard driver, tracked as CVE-2020-15368. The toolkit was modular, with a console that mirrored the interface of the targeted devices, so less skilled operators could carry out attacks that would otherwise take specialist knowledge. Many of its functions used the devices’ normal management protocols rather than software bugs.

The agencies urged critical infrastructure organizations, especially in the energy sector, to apply the detection and mitigation steps in the advisory.

Why it got so much attention

Wired reported the same day that Dragos considered Pipedream an unusually versatile tool for attacking industrial control systems, and that Dragos had high confidence it had not yet been deployed for disruptive or destructive effects. In other words, defenders found it before it was used to cause physical damage. Dragos also said patching the flaws it used would not prevent most of its capabilities, because it was largely built to abuse functions the devices were designed to have. Defense depended on keeping attackers away from the devices in the first place.

The mitigations in AA22-103A are written for industrial operators, but most of them are good practice for any business that runs connected equipment:

  • Isolate control networks from corporate and internet networks with strong perimeter controls, and limit communication in and out.
  • Require multi-factor authentication for all remote access to control networks and devices wherever possible.
  • Change default passwords to strong, device-unique passwords, and change device passwords on a consistent schedule.
  • Limit connections to control systems to specifically allowed management and engineering workstations.
  • Keep known-good offline backups of device firmware and configurations, and check their integrity, so you can recover quickly.
  • Install endpoint detection and response on the management subnets, and collect and keep logs from control systems.
  • Use least privilege. Use admin accounts only when needed, for tasks such as installing software updates.
  • Have an incident response plan and exercise it with IT, security and operations staff together.
  • Investigate odd behavior. The advisory listed delays in communications, loss of function requiring a reboot, and slow responses to operator commands as possible signs of malicious activity.

What this means for a smaller business

You may not run PLCs, but you may well have equipment that shares the same traits: it controls something physical, it was installed by a vendor, and nobody updates or reviews it on a schedule. Production machines, HVAC and building controls, door access systems and cameras all fit.

Questions worth asking:

  • Is this equipment on the same network as office computers, or separated by a firewall?
  • Can a vendor reach it remotely? How, and with what kind of authentication?
  • Are the default passwords still in place?
  • Is there a backup of its configuration that you could restore if the device were wiped?
  • Would anyone notice if it started behaving oddly?

Separating these systems is usually the most valuable single change. A firewall between the office network and plant or building equipment means a phishing email on a desk computer cannot reach a controller directly. The managed firewall page explains how that separation is maintained, and the manufacturing industry page covers the IT side of production environments.

What to do next

List every piece of equipment on your network that controls something physical, along with the vendor that supports it and how that vendor connects remotely. Remove remote access paths nobody uses, and put MFA on the ones that remain. Then confirm that the office and equipment networks are separated. If you want help finding what is connected and how it is reached, you can request a Blind Spot Scan.

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